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ABSTRACT

Mobile Agent Based Attack Resistant Architecture for
Distributed Intrusion Detection System
Sentil Selliah
The majority of the Distributed Intrusion Detection systems lack measures for
providing security and integrity to their own components. The hierarchical organization
and the static nature of the intrusion detection components in a largely distributed
environment make them the likely targets of attacks. By disabling few operationally
critical components along the hierarchy, an attacker can succeed in disabling the
system’s capability to correctly detect intrusions. One solution to this problem is to
eliminate the system components’ static nature by wrapping them as mobile agents.
Through mobility we achieve an attack resistant architecture for the hierarchical
distributed intrusion detection components. As mobile agents, these components can hide
in a complex network topology, constantly roaming to avoid detection, and be replaced
when compromised. In this thesis we analyze an approach where mobile agents replace
the static internal components of a hierarchical distributed intrusion detection system.
We developed a system for this model using IBM’s Java based mobile agent
(Aglet) framework with the following features: randomized agent locations, decoy agents
to allude an attacker from functionally critical components, a redundant polling
mechanism to ensure the integrity of mobile agents’ data processing and a mechanism
for the mobile agents’ to avoid malicious hosts.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Computer Security

Web site defacements, Worm attacks and Denial of Service attacks have become
headline topics in many technical news sources recently. Over the passed couple of
decades attacks on computer infrastructures have increased sharply, in pace with the
booming growth of the Internet. The increased deployment of computer networks over
the Internet by commercial organizations, academic institutions and individuals have
provided a playing field for intruders carrying out attacks on computer systems since
many of the deployed systems are vulnerable to attacks. Increased sophistication of
attack techniques and the widespread availability of automated intrusion tools pose a
challenging threat to the security of computer network infrastructures. As a result
Computer Security, largely neglected a decade ago, has become the focal point of many
commercial as well as academic institutions. Computers lacking security on the Internet
are targets for widespread attacks as well provide a gateway to carry out attacks on other
computer systems.
Generally speaking secure computer system is defined “as one that can be
depended upon to behave as it is expected to” [GS96]. The expected behavior of a secure
computer system would be in accordance with its specified security policy [San95].
Intrusion into a computer system is seen as a violation of the security policy in place.
The above definition can be refined to reflect three important attributes of a secure
computer behavior. They are confidentiality, integrity and availability.
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Confidentiality ensures that the system information is only accessible to authorized
persons. Integrity ensures that the information is not altered by unauthorized persons and
not detectable by the authorized one. Availability ensures the accessibility of system
resources for authorized users whenever necessary.
Threats to a computer system can come in different forms. Simple scripts that
exploit system vulnerabilities to elevate privileges, unsupervised virus and worm
programs capable of performing undesired damages to the system and multiplying to
affect other systems, and very sophisticated distributed/coordinated attacks that render a
system unavailable are few forms. A secure system should posses the ability to prevent
any attacks aimed at themselves. If the system fails in the prevention mechanism it
should be capable of detecting any forms of security violation.
At present there are several mechanisms in place to ensure the security of a
computer system. Many systems utilize an authentication model as a first line of defense.
This model provides access to a system’s resources only to a trusted domain. But it does
not restrict a trusted member of the domain on activities that could be performed on the
resources. An intruder could penetrate a system by circumventing these authentication
and access control mechanisms by exploiting bugs in the operating system software and
application software that run on the computer system. Unless perfect bug free software is
developed it would be impossible to prevent any intrusions into a system. Hence
computer systems cannot solely depend on access control and flow control mechanisms
to provide a blanket of security. Hence there should exist other measures that are capable
of identifying security breaches or recognizing any measures that are indicative of a pre-
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attack scenario and reporting these events to the system security officer. Intrusion
detection server’s this purpose by forming the last line of defense against the intruders.

1.2 Intrusion Detection System

An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is responsible for performing Intrusion
Detection within a system. A computer requires the analysis of it’s data and activities
individually to detect any intrusions into the system. However the detection of
coordinated and distributed attacks requires the collective analysis of information
gathered at various locations off of a number of systems. Because the nature of the
coordinated and distributed attacks is that its ability to be a normal behavior on an
individual nature and of an anomalous behavior on a collective nature. Hence, a system
(Distributed Intrusion Detection System) responsible for detecting distributed attacks
requires components that spread across different (networks of) computers which build the
distributed environment.

1.3 Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS)

The first generation of Distributed Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS) followed a
simple, so called two component model, with sensor components collecting the data at
various points and a centralized component performing analysis and detection. This
model, although suitable for small systems, does not scale well for large distributed
systems, since the centralized analysis component has to deal with large volumes of data
processing. Hence, the later versions of DIDS introduced middle layers that are
responsible for data reduction and analysis (see Figure 1). A tree like hierarchical
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organization is preferred for these components. Consequently, functional components of
a DIDS can be categorized into three layers:
•

Leaf Nodes (Sensors)
Leaf Nodes are responsible for collecting data in their local computer/network.
Input to these nodes is any information that could lead to the detection of
intrusions. For example log files, network packets and system call traces are
some of the examples. The data collected by leaf nodes is sent to the internal
nodes.

•

Internal Nodes
These nodes are responsible for analyzing and reducing the volume of data
received from one or more sensors. The analyzers pass along the further reduced
information relevant for intrusion detection to the root node.

•

Root Node (Command and Control Point)
The root node is a centralized processing unit that is responsible for identifying
any intrusions based on the data it receives from the analyzers. The root node
carries out active and/or passive counter measures in cases of positive detection.

1.4 Security of Distributed IDS components

We expect a system that forms a last line of defense against attackers to be secure
itself. But the security of DIDS components has become an exception rather than the rule.
The static nature of the components of an intrusion detection system are vulnerable to
attacks themselves.
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root node

internal nodes
leaf nodes

Fig 1 The Architecture of a Hierarchical Distributed Intrusion Detection System

In fact, components of intrusion detection systems are popular targets for attackers.
Especially in a distributed environment, if an attacker disables few components along the
hierarchy of an intrusion detection system, the result is the reduced detection capability
or, in the worst case, the elimination of intrusion detection. As a result, an intruder could
invisibly penetrate the system by circumventing the intrusion detection capability. This
inherent weakness of most commercially available intrusion detection systems is a result
of their hierarchical and static organization. At the same time, organizing components
into a hierarchical architecture provides many performance and organizational
advantages, including efficiency and flexibility. The alternative approach of organizing
intrusion detection components into a non-hierarchical architecture, where the
components of the DIDS are completely distributed in nature, has proven inefficient both
in detecting and reporting attacks [PM99]. Majority of the current research in intrusion
detection is focused on the intrusion detection techniques, including data mining and
intrusion reporting. Protecting components of an intrusion detection system from attacks
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or identifying and reconstructing the components that have been disabled to ensure the
proper functionality of the intrusion detection has received limited attention [Axe99,
Hak99].

1.5 Thesis statement

In this thesis we attempt to provide an attack resistant architecture for intrusion
detection systems, while keeping intact the hierarchical organization. An attack resistant
nature provides the DIDS components the much needed security to exist in a distributed
environment. At the same time providing ability for the root node to identify and destroy
a malicious component without affecting the critical functionality of the overall system.
We achieve this goal by eliminating the static nature of the internal components and
wrapping them as mobile agents (MA). As MA’s the IDS components can evade attacks.
The constant movement of these agents in a network among multiple hosts makes it
difficult for an attacker to locate and disable them. Further, these agents could obtain
information about malicious hosts and avoid them in the network. So called decoy
agents, explained later, can insert junk traffic into the network to distract the attacker off
of the critical functional components.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related work.
Chapter 3 outlines the architectural features of the proposed attack resistant architecture
for distributed intrusion detection systems. Chapter 4 describes some of the critical issues
underlying the proposed design, such as agent communication, location, etc. Chapter 5
outlines appropriate methodology for system implementation. We conclude with a
summary and an overview of further work in Chapter 6.
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2. Background and Related Work

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides background information on concepts related to our thesis
and describes several Intrusion Detection systems that provide solutions to the prevention
of attacks on the intrusions detection system components. We call the latter attack
resistance capability of an ID system. Many research and commercial entities have
released prototypes or complete versions of distributed intrusion detection systems whose
hierarchical organization poses a major threat to the system’s integrity. Lack of emphasis
on the ID system’s security and various operating system functional discrepancies have
led to attacks that damaged, evaded and misdirected intrusion detection systems. A
recent survey [Axe99] selects only two out of twenty systems with moderate or high
security features. A recent survey of commercial ID systems [Hak99] provides similar
results.

2.2 Intrusion Detection

An intrusion is defined by Anderson [And80] as the deliberate unauthorized
attempt to :
•

access information,

•

manipulate information, or

•

render a system unreliable or unusable.
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An intrusion violates the security policy of a system in place. Intrusion detection is
the process of detecting intrusive activities through the observation of an attack in
progress or from recognizing the effects of an intrusion after the fact. The techniques
used to detect intrusions on a system require the knowledge of either the expected
behavior of the system or the attacks that could be carried out against the system.
Intrusion detection techniques can be categorized into two main groups: anomaly
intrusion detection and misuse intrusion detection [MHL94]. Anomaly detection
techniques identify any unacceptable deviation from expected behavior of an individual
user or an application. The expected behavior is defined in advance, in manually or
automatically developed profiles. This is then compared with the current activities of the
user or the application. An uncharacteristic deviation would be an indication of an
intrusion. For example, if a user typically uses his/her account to check mail and run a
Web browser, an activity on his/her account that runs large programs is anomalous and,
hence, might be the result of an intrusion. Anomaly detection attempts to compare the
current and the expected user behavior and flags unexpected/atypical behaviors as
potentially intrusive. [AL95] describes a statistical approach used for Anomaly Detection.
On the other hand misuse intrusion detection refers to the analysis of certain welldefined patterns of attacks that exploit weaknesses in system and application software.
For example, packets of network traffic could be analyzed for a series of characters,
which could represent a signature of an attack sequence. This mechanism requires the
knowledge of unacceptable behavior to detect an intrusion as opposed to anomaly
detection, which is based on the identification of normal behavior.
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An Intrusion Detection System uses either one of the above techniques or both of
them together to detect any intrusions into the computer system.

2.3 Mobile Agents

Mobility of the DIDS components are important part of our solution. This is achieved
through wrapping these components as mobile agents. One possible definition for a
Mobile Agent is :
‘A computational entity, which acts on behalf of others, is autonomous, proactive and
reactive and exhibits capabilities to learn, cooperate and move’. Since roots of this
definition come from distributed intelligent systems, many argue that a basic agent model
is not required to exhibit any learning capability. As a result there exist many definitions
for a mobile agent. However based on the experience with respect to our project, we
adopt the above definition minus the capability to learn (not intelligent).
A framework is required for a system to incorporate Mobile Agents (Refer to Appendix
A for a description on Java based Aglet Framework Model). In addition to providing the
basic agent model, the framework is required to provide the following:
1. Life-cycle Model: Create, start, dispose, stop, suspend and destroy an agent.
2. Computational Model: ability for an agent to perform data processing and
manipulation.
3. Security Model: Agents’ ability to access system resources and system’s ability to
access agent’s results securely.
4. Communication Model: Ability to communicate with other agents.
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The general advantages of using mobile agents are numerous including reduced
network latency, reduction of network load and autonomous execution. Hence, there are
many applications that could utilize mobile agents. However ensuring the security and
reliability of the agents that circulate the network and the security of the remote hosts
(host providing agent framework) has become very challenging and a major restraining
factor for the deployment of agent based technologies. There are two different categories
of threats: threats stemming from an agent attacking an agent platform and an agent
platform attacking agents [JK99].
Agent attacking the Platform
In this category of attacks an agent could exploit any security weakness that may
exist in the host platform. Denial of service attacks, masquerading attacks and accessing
unauthorized information are few threats a platform could face by malicious agents. In
denial of service attacks the agents could consume excessive amount of platform
resources and render the platform unavailable to other agents. In a masquerading attack
the agent could imitate another agent and gain privileges to access the platform’s
resources which is not entitled to. These attacks might cause information loss, operational
failures and even modification of system critical information.
Platform attacking agents
The mobile agents hop from one host to the other with the static code,
accumulated states and data. Since the host provides the execution environment for the
agents, the host has complete control over it, and can use it to analyze or modify the code
and the results or, worse, destroy the agents.
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Denial of service attacks, alteration of agent code, masquerading attacks are some
of the threats posed by a host to the agents. In the denial of service attacks a malicious
host could deny resources to the agent that are necessary for it’s execution. The host
could masquerade as a trusted host to attract agents and then analyze or modify their
code.
Various studies have discussed solutions to protect a host from attacks by agents.
Some of the proposed solutions include execution of digitally signed agents, isolated
execution of agent code, proof carrying code, authorization and attribute certificates.
Research and solution for protecting agents from malicious host is in it’s infancy stage
due to it’s complex nature. Since it’s very hard to protect an entity which runs under
another entity’s authority. There are even arguments that a general solution for these kind
of threats are impossible. However there exists very complex application specific
solutions like partial result encapsulation, computing with encrypted function, obfuscated
code and execution tracing.

2.4 Related Systems
2.4.1

Bro
The Bro [Ver88] is a standalone system capable of detecting intrusions by

passively monitoring network activities. The Bro system can be divided into three distinct
layers. Each layer would responsible in performing data reduction. The lower layer
captures raw network packets for further processing. These packets are passed onto the
middle layer, which is the so-called event engine. The event engine decides whether the
packet should be logged or not based on certain control connection state handlers. The
top layer is the scripting interface that enables the addition of new control handlers. The
11

paper presenting the Bro system addresses the problems of the attacks the monitor could
withstand.
Three categories of attacks are mentioned by the author that could be carried out
against the Bro system and mechanisms that are adopted to detect and prevent these
attacks[Ver88].
Overload Attacks
The goal of this attack is to overburden the monitor to a point where it fails to
keep up with the data stream it needs to process. Hence failing to detect an intrusion
afterwards. The Bro system handles these types of attacks by shedding some load when it
becomes heavily stressed. logging at regular intervals, how many packets it has dropped
and processed, which in turn could be used to determine the anomalous nature of the
network traffic.
Crash Attacks
The purpose of these attacks is to stop the monitor altogether. These attacks could
be carried out by analyzing the source code for any vulnerability due to coding errors or
by exhausting the monitor’s resources completely. Careful coding practices and extensive
testing would elevate the first type of attacks. In order to defend against the second type
of crash attack the Bro utilizes a watch dog monitor which expires every T seconds. Upon
expiration the monitor checks to see whether the system has failed to process any packets
in the previous T seconds slot. If so the monitor assumes a processing jam and stops the
system for post mortem analysis. During this time the monitor logs the packets. Hence
any intrusion that follows after a crash attack is recorded.
Subterfuge Attacks
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These attacks involve misleading the monitor as to the meaning of traffic it
analyzes. These attacks are the hardest to detect. The author claims that certain
assumptions that were taken at the time of development in order to prevent these types of
attacks. The author lists several of these attacks but no claims have been made on
whether these attacks were tested against Bro and been dealt with.

2.4.2

The Mobile Agent Attack Resistant Distributed Hierarchical Intrusion
Detection System *
Mell and McLarnon [PM99] proposed a methodology for providing attack

resistant capabilities for hierarchical ID systems. This is achieved by wrapping the nonleaf components of an IDS as mobile agents (MA), hence eliminating the static nature of
these components and providing an attack resistant capabilities to the IDS. The ability of
the mobile agents to move between different platforms and avoid attacks is the focal
point of the system. The authors divide the techniques used to implement attack
resistance into five stages.
Randomizing agent locations
The mobile agents continuously move between networks by randomly selecting
an agent platform among several that are available. The continuous and random
movement of these agents around the network will complicate attacker’s intention of
pinpointing agent location to destroy it. The authors mention that an avenue of attacks
against system would be to monitor agent communication between agent platforms and
analyze the underlying transport header information to determine the number of agents
that exist in certain platforms and the agent platforms they desire to communicate with.

*

We incorporated few ideas into the development of our system from this proposal.
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However, the authors claim that the attacker would require sufficient sniffing points to do
so.
Removing Centralized Directory Services
The authors claim that an attacker could find and destroy the centralized directory
services that are necessary for the proper functioning of the agents. Eliminating these
single points of failure would be of complicated task. The authors propose a concurrent
negotiation algorithm for inter agent communication that would eliminate a centralized
directory service. This algorithm requires an agent to buddy up with another agent at the
time of its deployment. Then they constantly notify each other about their where about.
Evading Attackers
Destroying an agent platform may lead to the death of an agent. In this case the
authors mention that the buddies of the agents should detect this event and avoid network
locations suspected to host attackers and inform other agents about the event.
Resurrecting Killed agents
In case of an agent being killed they are substituted by back up agents to hold
their positions. These back up agents are constantly updated with state information of the
active agent. In case of an active agent’s death the backup agents negotiate among
themselves and pick a candidate for replacement.

2.4.3

RealSecure
RealSecure [ISS01] is a commercial distributed intrusion detection system

developed by Internet Security Systems (ISS). The documentation does not provide
sufficient information about securing components of the intrusion detection system.
However, a survey done by [Hak99] sheds some light onto the defensive measures taken

14

by RealSecure. The RealSecure consists of RealSecure Engines, RealSecure Agents, and
RealSecure Manager. The system uses encrypted communication channels for
communication between the distributed agents and the centralized manager. The agents
transmit an "I'm alive" heart beat message to the manager at regular intervals to indicate
their status. In cases when these messages are not received the manager assumes that the
agent is attacked. Obviously, this approach does not consider the possibility of agents
being compromised.

2.4.4

An Architecture for Intrusion Detection using Autonomous Agents (AAFID)

Balasubramaniyam et.al. propose an architecture [BG98] for building Intrusion
Detection Systems. that use agents as their lowest level element for data collection and
analysis and employs a hierarchical structure for scalability. A simple example of a
system that adheres to the AAFID architecture consists of the following three essential
components: agents, transceivers and monitors. Here agents are not necessarily mobile
but certainly autonomous. An AAFID system can be distributed over any number of hosts
in a network. Each host can host many agents that monitor for interesting activities in that
host. Agents report their findings to a single transceiver. Transceivers are per-host entities
that monitor the operations of agents and control their functionality running in their host.
Finally the transceivers report their results to one or more monitors. Each monitor
oversee several transceivers. They perform higher level correlation on the results
obtained from the transceivers, to detect any distributed attacks. The authors have raised
some issues regarding the reliability and security of the architecture’s inter-host
communication (Communication between different components of the architecture).
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Reliability
Reliability determines that the messages from one host to another arrive correctly
and on time. The authors point out that the reliability factor may or may not produce
drastic impact on the operation of an IDS in terms of the ability to detect intrusions.
Further they claim the meaning of “acceptable” loss of messages depends on the
deployed system.
Security
The authors claim that privacy and authentication are two important needs for an
IDS, Since they would generate sensitive information about hosts. Attacker should not
posses the capability to generate false messages that are accepted as legitimate.
Cryptography is seen as the proper solution to prevent these malicious activities with the
added cost in performance and overhead imposed on the system. Further the authors
mention the denial of service attacks through which an attacker could prevent the ID
system from accepting legitimate messages.
The authors stop short of providing any definite conclusions instead they discuss about
three questions. They are ‘is privacy necessary?’, ‘is authentication necessary?’ and ‘how
to implement them?’.
This system mainly deals with the security of the communication mechanism on
the IDS components, but lacks discussions and suggestions on the component’s security
itself.
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3. The Attack Resistant Architecture

3.1 Introduction
The components of a Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) 1 are spread
across network topology that builds a distributed environment. Their ability to properly
function is vital for the detection of coordinated attacks that are carried out against the
distributed system. Failure of some of these components would reduce or, in the worst
case, eliminate the detection capability of the DIDS. As a result, an attacker could
penetrate the system and avoid being detected. Hence, functionally critical DIDS
components are favorite targets for attacks. In this section we elaborate measures that
could be taken by attackers to disable the DIDS components and prevention mechanisms
to survive these attacks.

3.2 Communication (Authentication, Encryption and Reliability)
The hierarchical nature of the DIDS largely depends on the communication
between components for information accumulation that is required to detect intrusions
and to implement countermeasures. Insecure and unreliable communication will hinder
the accurate detection of intrusions. The data flows upward the hierarchy from lower
nodes to upper level nodes. Control information flows from the root node to the lower
nodes. An attacker may explore avenues for disrupting the communication mechanisms
and even attempt to analyze traffic flow between DIDS components.

1

We only refer to DIDS whose components are hierarchically organized. Refer Chapter 1 for a description
of hierarchical organization of DIDS components.
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Analyzing the contents of communication traffic might reveal sensitive information about
host that are being monitored as well as the DIDS components’ logistic information.
Hence it becomes necessary that the DIDS components adopt a secure communication
mechanism. We restrict our discussion only to the underlying network transport security.
Physical security of the communication links is beyond the scope of this document. This
disable an attacker during his reconnaissance phase. Encryption and authentication of
messages that are interchanged between the DIDS components would provide a degree of
privacy and disable attempts by an attacker to generate false messages that are accepted
by the components as legitimate.
The strength and success of encryption and authentication depends on the underlying
algorithms and the distribution of keys involved. Although encryption and authentication
sound promising in providing secure component communication, they impose a
significant cost and overhead on the systems. Since encryption and authentication
involves, performing complex mathematical operations. Hence, a careful analysis of
requirements for secure communication is deemed necessary since reduced performance
of a system affects the timely processing and submission of intrusion warnings.
Loss of messages may be a significant factor in the functioning of a DIDS.
A DIDS monitoring a time critical high assurance system might not tolerate even a small
amount of message loss. But on the other hand a DIDS monitoring distributed web
servers could accommodate a certain level of message loss and still perform detections at
an acceptable rate. Hence requirements for reliable communication will vary from system
to system.
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Providing secure and reliable solutions for communication can be part of the
component itself or can be provided by the network transport protocol that is being
operated on. Widely used transport protocol, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
[Pos81], provides reliability for the data being transferred but lacks the encryption or
authentication capability. TCP combined with secure Internet Protocol (IP-SEC) [AK98]
can provide the additional encryption and authentication capabilities for communication.
Alternatively, the use of these well established data transport mechanisms could be
substituted with a customized transport protocol for DIDS component communication.
But it comes with the complexity of developing a new transport protocol.
The above mentioned secure communication mechanisms complicates traffic
analysis attacks and masquerading attacks. Denial of service attack is another type of
attacks that can be carried out against the components. This attack is carried out by
overloading components into servicing large number of garbage requests. To prevent
these kind of attacks very careful measures should be taken to handle unexpected
conditions. This could be achieved by careful design and comprehensive testing of the
system.

3.3 Location Transparency
Identification of the DIDS components would be the first information an attacker
attempts to gather. In a TCP/IP based network, IP address identifies network
component’s location. Static allocation of DIDS components increases the chances of
being detected. In addition, static allocation of DIDS components to provide a convenient
scenario to perform reconnaissance operations over a period of time. But the failure to
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disclose a component’s location to other components of the system would render it
unreachable. This defeats the purpose of collaboration of the DIDS components.

Constant movement of the DIDS components solves the location transparency
problem. Reasonable frequency of movement may confuse an attacker. But moving
components requires that they save their execution state before movement to avoid loss
of previous results. It would be inefficient for a large server to constantly move among a
set of networks because of it’s comprehensive state related information.
Another suitable mechanism is to use multicast for communication. Nature of
multicast enables members of a group to join and listen on a multicast group address for
messages communicated to that group. Multicast protocols do not require that the sender
is aware of individual group members. In contrast point-to-point communication requires
that the sender is aware of it’s receivers addresses. Multicast is based on the unreliable
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [PS80]. However there exist multicast protocols that
support reliable transmissions [MR98]. In order for components to communicate, the
message gets send out to the whole group consisting many members, rather than sending
to a single member. This would result in unnecessary traffic consuming the network
bandwidth. Hence the system should analyze the issues carefully before utilizing the use
of movement of components and multicast as a form of communication.

3.4 Destruction of Components
It is a very difficult task to protect DIDS components from attacks since they are
spread across a wide area of heterogeneous networks. A best effort scheme should be
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adopted to protect the components against intruders. At the same time additional
mechanisms should exist to recover the components that are destroyed or warn other
components about imminent risks. This to be successfully operational the root security
controller should continuously keep track of the ‘alive/dead’ state of the components. The
components of a DIDS are individual programs running on a general purpose computer
or a specially dedicated server only performing DIDS activities. A data analysis
component may be of a the first form and a root node responsible for detecting intrusions
take the latter form. Hence an attack may disable the entire server or the single process or
in the worst case control their activities. The functionally critical components like the
root node can be strictly protected against attacks by operating it in a secure system. In
this section we focus on small system components since they lack very strong security
measures.
An attacker killing a component entirely would result in the lack of result
submissions from that component. Another technique is to require a component to send
out a heart beat message at a regular interval to the root security controller. When this
message stops the security controller could assume the destruction of the component.
Similar technique is used in RealSecure [ISS01] mentioned in Section 2 of this document.
A clever attacker might attempt to take control of the component by intruding the
machine it runs on and manipulate or modify it to carry out attacks on other components.
Detection and prevention of these kind of malicious activities can be very challenging.
Solutions vary from implementing a simple host based intrusion detection system on the
machines that host the components to profiling component activities and identifying
anomalous behavior. The process of identifying the components’ destruction or
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modification should be followed by elimination and replacement or repair of the
components.
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4. Mobile Agent Based Attack Resistant Architecture for a Distributed
IntrusionDetection System
In this section we describe our approach to building an attack resistant
architecture for a DIDS using mobile Agents.

4.1 Intuition Behind our Approach
As described in chapter 1, a hierarchical ID system consists of three main layers of
operational components:
1. Root node functions as a centralized decision-maker.
2. Internal nodes perform data analysis and reduction.
3. Leaf nodes perform data collection.
The root node is a centralized server, which accumulates all necessary information from
the internal nodes to make a collective decision on whether an intrusion has occurred or
not. In addition, it devises counter measures in the event of an intrusion. Since there is
only one root node, taking into account its role, we assume that it can be protected
reasonably well to prevent major security infringements by some of the existing methods
(trusted server on a trusted network, for example). Our major concern is the security of
leaf nodes and the internal components since they are distributed among various (possibly
insecure) networks making them vulnerable to attacks. We claim that by sufficiently
securing these nodes we can provide an attack resistant IDS architecture operating in a
largely distributed environment. In this thesis, we concentrate on the methodology that
provides an added level of assurance and survivability for internal components of a
hierarchical IDS. Our approach concentrates on the mobility of the internal nodes. At
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this time, no provisions are made for the mobility of leaf nodes, since their function is to
capture data from certain points on the network.

4.2 Mobility of Internal Components
The concept explored in this document is building the internal components of the
IDS utilizing mobile agents (MA) technology. For this purpose, we restrict the definition
of mobile agents as follows:
‘Mobile Agents are autonomous software entities that are capable of moving
among platforms in different networks.’
The mobility enables the components to evade attacks by changing their physical
locations frequently. The agents also have the capability to avoid network locations that
might have been maliciously tampered with, until measures have been taken to evaluate
the “attack”.
Attack resistant mobile agents operate in an architecture where leaf nodes
(referred to from this point on as monitors) are network intrusion detection systems
(NIDS). These monitors passively observe the network traffic and report any intrusive
behavior to the agents, i.e. the middle layer components. In general, different group of
agents would be responsible for processing data received from different monitors. The
agents try to build a cumulative knowledge of the activities in the networks that come
under their supervision. Analyzed data is sent up to the root node, which is responsible
for determining whether an intrusion has occurred. Figure 2 illustrates an example of the
system architecture.
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Networks/Subnetworks

Mobile Agent Platform (A computer with agent framework)
Monitors (Leaf Nodes)
Root Node

Voting Server
Mobile Agent

Fig 2. Physical Layout of the System.

4.3 Assumptions
We have adopted several assumptions in the development of our model. It is
necessary that the reader perceives our system model in the context of these assumptions.

4.3.1

Redundant Mobile agent (MA) Platforms
The distributed environment where the DIDS is employed consists of redundant

MA platforms that are distributed across several heterogeneous networks. These
platforms are equally capable of hosting mobile agents and providing all resources
necessary for the proper execution. However we do not necessitate MA platforms to

25

provide a secure execution environment. Refer Section 4.4.4 for more information on
agent security.

4.3.2

Secure Public/Private Key Infrastructure
For the purpose of encryption and authentication of messages that are exchanged

between components of the DIDS, there exists a secure architecture capable of
distributing public and private keys to the DIDS components. This ensures that an
attacker is not capable of carrying out attacks against the components by compromising
the keys.

4.3.3

Compromising MA Platforms
MA platforms can be a process in a general purpose computer. Hence

compromising the system that hosts the MA platform is a possibility. After a system
compromise an attacker may or may not have sufficient privileges to shutdown the MA
platform on the host. But we assume that the attacker lacks sufficient resources to scan a
group of networks to identify all the systems that host a MA platform.

4.3.4

Malicious Leaf Node Components
It is necessary to understand that attacks on the internal components of the DIDS

could be carried out directly or through the leaf nodes of the system. An attacker can
easily carry out denial of service attacks by overloading the internal components of the
system through leaf nodes. Security of the leaf nodes is not discussed in the thesis. We
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assume that the leaf nodes are not compromised to carry out attacks against the non-leaf
components.

4.4 System Architecture
In this section we provide details regarding the concepts utilized in creating an
attack resistant mobile agents based distributed intrusion detection scheme and evaluate
it’s advantages and drawbacks.
4.4.1

Randomized Agent Location
Mobility of DIDS components 2 immediately eliminates some of the threats posed

by attackers. Constant movement enables the agents to indirectly hide their locations and
evade being detected. However a predefined pattern of movement would not be much of
an attack prevention mechanism since a determined attacker could predict agent locations
after some extensive analysis of traffic flow among different platforms. This could be
eliminated by random movement of the components.
When the agents are created they are located randomly among different networks
and platforms within the distributed system. When they are active in a MA platform they
perform analysis and reduction on data received from the monitors. After processing they
move to their new location. In the absence of any data transmission from the monitors the
agents stay stable in the MA platform until a timer expires.
The choice of the next destination is selected from a list of other MA platforms
that is maintained by individual MA platform. The agents can then randomly choose a

2

In the rest of the section components refer to internal components only, unless stated otherwise.
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location of their next destination. The constant randomized movement of the agents is
expected to confuse an attacker.

Parent responsible for
creating child agents

MA list

atp://157.182.194.30:400
http://157.182.194.12:434
.
.
.
http://157.182.194.27:744

Randomized Agent
Distribution

Agent moves after
Timer expires

Agent moves after
Data processing
MA Platforms

Fig 3. Randomization of Agent Locations with in a single network

One possible avenue of attack against our system could be by obtaining the list of
locations/networks from the MA platforms. This information would enable the attacker to
target MA platforms and, potentially, hinder the functionality of the agents. We can put
in place several measures to identify MA platform compromises. A host based ID system
could be installed to monitor any intrusive behaviors in the MA platforms locally.
Another protective measure could be populating the MA platform list with many bogus
MA platforms that could act as “honey pots”. These “honey pots” could raise their alarm
when anything other than a digitally signed mobile agent tries to communicate to it.
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If an attacker gains access to the MA platform by surpassing all the measures in place
he/she would have the ability to control the activities of the agents and modify the agent
code. In the later sections we illustrate a redundant polling mechanism that could mask
any incorrect results provided by malicious agents.

4.4.2

Agent Communication
The mobile agents should have a secure communication mechanisms to receive

information from the monitors as well as to exchange their results with other components
in the hierarchy. The leaf nodes communicate with the agents by multicasting their results
to a group address. Hence the leaf nodes do not require any knowledge of the individual
agent’s locations. The agents responsible for processing this information listen
on the same group address as the monitors. This mechanism eliminates security concerns
that may arise due to the fact that an attacker’s analysis of header information (which is
not encrypted on a standard implementation of IPv4) may reveal the agent location.
Passive role of the agent (consumption of monitor’s report only), makes them “invisible”.
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MA platforms listening on
Multicast group address X

MA platforms listening on
Multicast group address Y

Router

Router

Multicast to address X

Multicast to address Y

Network Monitor

Network Monitor

Distributed Attack
Fig 4. Agent Communication

4.4.3

Decoy Agents
Due to encryption an attacker will fail in his attempt to analyze traffic in order to

determine the contents of the message as well as the nodes’ locations. However the
attacker could set few sniffing points across the network and analyze the data flow based
on volume of traffic. Frequent and regular traffic flow towards certain points in the
network might represent critical node activities.
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By introducing decoy agents that roam around the network aimlessly generating
garbage traffic in the network. This serves the purpose of diverting an attacker away from
any critical system components. The garbage traffic inserted into the network by the
decoy agents is a suitable mechanism to throw some confusion into the analysis process
of the attacker.

4.4.4

Mobile Agent Security
The security of the mobile agents is one of the major concerns of our system

development. The security of the agents can be compromised by other malicious agents
or by a malicious platform hosting agents. When an agent arrives at it’s platform, it runs
under the control of the platform host. A malicious platform can destroy an agent or
modify it’s sequence of execution leading to the generation of incorrect results. The same
could be caused by malicious agents. Either way, it is necessary for the higher level
DIDS components to identify results that are generated by both malicious hosts and
agents.
There exist an extensive research in this area with varying claims ranging from
the impossibility of agent security to very complex solutions, like partial agent result
encryption, obfuscated code, to provide agent security [Ng00]. We refrain from assuming
that the agents are secured by some mechanisms. Even if the agents lack any means of
securing themselves from malicious activities, the proposed intrusion detection scheme is
better than the existing ones, since it enhances the security of the internal components by
concepts of mobility and passivity.
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Our approach to polling/voting takes advantage of redundant MA platforms in the
network (Fig 5a). A group of agents is responsible for processing data multicast by the
monitors. All the members of the agent group perform the same functions on the same
data sets received from the monitors. Hence they are expected to produce the same
results. These redundant results are sent to a voting server where a voting mechanism is
carried out to determine the majority results (Fig 5b). This elected result is considered as
correct result of the agents and is reported to the root node. Note that simple majority
voting mechanisms can tolerate a certain number of messages lost in network traffic.
Extensive research of voting mechanisms and their fault tolerance properties is out of the
scope of this thesis, however, an interested reader can find some of the relevant
information in [LKE89, SD89].
A1
Mobile Agent
Platform 1 (MAP 1)
MAP 2
A2
A3
MAP 3
MAP 4
Fig 5a. Multiple agents submitting their results for Voting Server.

A1 -à R1
A2 -à R2

Voting
Server

R1

A3 -à R1

Fig 5b. Voting on the Voting Server.
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Finally, our distributed intrusion detection scheme performs critical decision
making tasks in a trusted host rather than an insecure MA platform. Whenever there is an
incorrect result(s) or there are no results from agents, the voting server tags the agents
and the MA platform as suspicious since the incorrect results may be due to either the
malicious MA platform or the malicious agent or of both, as a worst case (Refer
Appendix B for the algorithm that adjusts the trust levels of agents and hosts). The trust
level of either the agent or an MA platform deteriorates when it is in disagreement with
the others. At certain point in time, the voting server excludes considering the results of
an untrusted agent or a MA platform (Fig 5c). In this case, a security breach alert is sent
out to the system security officer (SSO). The voting server continues excluding the
results until the SSO performs a post mortem analysis to eliminate any compromises
made to the system.
Agent
ID

Agent
Stat

Voting
Server

Host
Stat

A1
A2
A3

Host
ID
MA P1
MA P2
MA P3
MA P4

Trust
Level

A2 submits
wrong result

T1
T2
T3

Trust
Level

After
Voting

N1
N2
N3
N4

Agent
ID

Trust
Level

A1
A2
A3

T1
T2 -œ
T3

Host
ID
MA P1
MA P2
MA P3
MA P4

Trust
Level
N1
N2
N3 -ß
N4

Fig 5c. Voting Server updating Agent/Host Trust Level.
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4.4.5

Avoiding Malicious Host

The agents must avoid a malicious host of the MA platform. By avoiding these
locations the agents could reduce their vulnerability to attacks aimed at destroying them
or modifying their code to distract their intended functions. In order for the agents to
avoid the malicious platforms they need to be informed about them. This is achieved by
the voting server, which routinely distributes the list of malicious MA platforms. These
messages are sent in the encrypted form, and the list of recipients excludes the hosts
considered malicious. When an agent randomly chooses its next destination it avoids the
malicious platform. As mentioned earlier, voting server adds an MA platform to its
malicious host list when the host reaches the threshold indicative of a security breach.
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5. System Implementation
This section provides information regarding the test environment, tools that were
utilized for the system development and the detection mechanism that was used for
DIDS’s intrusion detection.

5.1 Intrusion Detection Technique
For the purpose of testing and to generate some tangible results, we implemented
a simple version of the Graph based Intrusion Detection system (GrIDS) [CC96]. The
GrIDS generates different shapes of graphs for a period of time that is an indication of a
large scale distributed attack. The nodes and the links of the graph represent the
compromised machines and the connection between the machines respectively. The
further propagation of the attack to other machines leads the way to the growth of the
tree. This tree representation is then summarized to produce results that are compared
with threshold values for an indication of an attack. We walk through an attack scenario
below.
Imagine an attacker ‘A’ trying to scan a class B (for instance 157.182.194/24)
network for common vulnerabilities on ports 20, 21, 22 and 80. With the use a port scan
tool he scans 10 machine for every 2 seconds with an interval of 3 seconds between each
scan. After the first scan ‘A’ finds a compromised host in the network. He runs the expoit
and gets root access. Now instead of running the scan from the first machine he runs the
scan from the compromised machine in the network, this time scanning another subntet
of the 16’s network. Unless all these scans are traced back to the attacker ‘A’, concluding
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that the attacker ‘A’ is responsible for a distributed attack would be impossible. At the
beginning of the first scan the GrIDS begins to develop an attack tree for these activities
as follows :
A

Compromised
157.182.194.20

157.182.194.25

157.182.194.89

Compromised
157.182.38.5

157.182.38.12

157.182.20.1

Fig 6. GrIDS tree for Scan Attack.

The description of the mechanism used to trace the different scans to the single attacker is
beyond the scope of this document. A detailed design description is available in [CC99].
After the generation of the graph (Fig 6) GrIDS engine calculates a graph summary. In
the above case it could be the number of machines and network that are scanned by the
attacker ‘A’. If this exceeds threshold values GrIDS identifies the activity of ‘A’ as an
attack.
In our system the mobile agents, as internal components of DIDS, are responsible
for generating activity trees for large scans on the network that they supervise. The trees
are generated when monitors (Leaf Nodes) alert them of any suspicious activities in their
locality. The independent activity trees are then sent to the Root Node. The root node
accumulates these independent graphs into one based on the relationship that exist
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between them. This would lead to the graph summary and an alarm is raised in case of
any attacks.

5.2 Mobile Agent Platform
Aglets Software Deve lopment Kit (ASDK) [Lan97,LO98], for the development
of Java based mobile agents, was chosen due to its easy availability over the Internet.
ASDK, developed by IBM, is a Java-based framework for implementing mobile agents.
The Aglet runtime layer provides functionality for creating, dispatching and disposing a
mobile agent. The Application Programmer Interface (API) is provided by a Graphical
User Interface (GUI) that also provides an environment for hosting mobile agents (MA
platforms). The Aglets server listens on a pre-specified port for any mobile agents that
are to be hosted in its environment. Each Aglet has its own thread of execution. Hence
the functionality of an Aglet is implemented in it’s run method. Before an Aglet is
dispatched to another Aglet server the class loader of the ASDK serializes the Aglets
state of execution. This enables the Aglets to save their state information so they could
be deserialized in another server.

5.3 Network Intrusion Detection System as Leaf Nodes
The leaf nodes of DIDS could have range of functionality varying from packet
filtering to host based or network based intrusion detection. The leaf nodes are
responsible for protecting their localities and report any anomalous activities to the
internal nodes for further analysis. For our system we opted for Snort [Roe99], a light
weight network intrusion detection system. Snort is capable of performing real-time
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traffic analysis and logging on IP networks. Its misuse intrusion detection technique
searches the traffic for any pattern matching with a set of predefined attack signatures.
For our purpose we used Snort to detect any network wide port scans and log the details
of the port scans. These alert logs are routinely sent as multicast transmissions to the
agent for the generation of attack trees.

5.4 Scanning Tool
We used Nmap [NMAP] to simulate a scanning attack. Nmap is a freely available
tool capable of carrying out rapid scans on a large network. It uses raw Internet Protocol
(IP) packets to determine what hosts are available on the network, types of services
provided by the hosts in a network and types of operating system that are used by the
hosts in the network. Vanilla Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connect scanning,
TCP SYN scanning, TCP FIN scanning and Internet Control Management Protocol
(ICMP) scanning are few of the type of scans that could be performed by the Nmap.

5.5 Test Bed
We carried out a simulation of our system. Due to the restrictions we had on the
usage of the network, our test was carried on few machines located on a single sub
network. The following figure illustrates the set up of our test architecture :
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Secure Root Server

Voting
Server

MA plat form 1

MA platform 2

Multicast of
log files
Machine 2

Machine 1

(Sub nets are monitored by Snort)

Fig 7. System test bed

Machine 1 and Machine 2 serve as leaf nodes by running the Network Intrusion
Detection Tool Snort. Any intrusions or intrusion attempts that are detected in these
machines will be multicast to group addresses mcasgrp 1 and mcastgrp 2, respectively.
MA platform 1 will listen for data transmissions on mcastgrp1 and MA platform 2 on
mcastgrp 2.
We carried out a simple TCP connect() port scan on one of our Class B sub
networks using Nmap’s TCP half-open (SYN) scan option for few open ports on the
hosts of the subnet. This scan was carried out as follows (Refer Appendix C for nmap
options):
nmap – sp 20, 21, 22, 23, 80, 111 157.182.194.89 157.182.194.39
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A TCP half-open scan sends a SYN packet to a port on the host and waits for a reply. An
open port would send would send back a SYN/ACK packet on the other hand a closed
port sends a RST packet. If a SYN/ACK packet is received a RST packet is sent to tear
down the connection. Usually a host logs details of a complete TCP connection initiation.
The TCP half-open scan is less likely to be logged since the connection was not
complete. The execution of this Nmap command produced the following result :

Starting nmap V. 2.53 by fyodor@insecure.org ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Interesting ports on localhost (157.182.194.89):
(The 1 port scanned but not shown below is in state: closed)
Port

State

21/tcp

open

ftp

22/tcp

open

ssh

23/tcp

open

telnet

80/tcp

open

http

111/tcp open

Service

sunrpc

Interesting ports on daffy.csee.wvu.edu (157.182.194.39):
(The 3 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
Port

State

21/tcp

open

ftp

80/tcp

open

http

111/tcp open

Service

sunrpc
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Nmap run completed -- 2 IP addresses (2 hosts up) scanned in 0 seconds
The following scans on the two machines were detected and logged by Snort. The log
files look as follows :
157.182.194.89’s Port_Scan.log
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63681 -> 157.182.194.89:20 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63682 -> 157.182.194.89:21 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63683 -> 157.182.194.89:22 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63684 -> 157.182.194.89:23 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63685 -> 157.182.194.89:80 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63686 -> 157.182.194.89:111 SYN ******S*

157.182.194.39’s Port_Scan.log
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63681 -> 157.182.194.39:20 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63682 -> 157.182.194.39:21 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63683 -> 157.182.194.39:22 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63684 -> 157.182.194.39:23 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63685 -> 157.182.194.39:80 SYN ******S*
Jul 4 14:53:54 157.182.194.28:63686 -> 157.182.194.39:111 SYN ******S*

In the rest of this section we will refer the computer with IP address
157.182.194.39 and the computer with IP address 157.182.194.89 as Machine 1 and
Machine 2 respectively. A script that runs on the these two machines routinely transfers
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the log files to the MA, through multicasting, in the following format (Machine 1
multicasts it’s log files to Mcast grp 1 and Macine 2 to Mcast grp 2) :

157.182.194.89’s Transfer Format
157.182.194.28 157.182.194.89:20, 157.182.194.89:21, 157.182.194.89:22
157.182.194.89:23, 157.182.194.89:80, 157.182.194.89:111
157.182.194.39’s Transfer Format
157.182.194.28 157.182.194.39:20, 157.182.194.39:21, 157.182.194.39:22
157.182.194.39:23, 157.182.194.39:80, 157.182.194.39:111

In the above format the attacker machine’s IP address is followed by a list of comma
separated IPaddress:port entries, which are the ports the attacker scanned on a machine.
The MA platforms listening on the multicast group receive and store these log data for
agent processing. As we mentioned earlier, the mobile agents build a tree representing
attacks on their locality based on these log file data.
Mobile agents belonging to MA platform 1 built a tree as follows :

157.182.194.28

157.182.194.39
:20

157.182.194.39
:21

157.182.194.39
:22

157.182.194.39
:23

157.182.194.39
:80

157.182.194.39
:111

Fig 8. Attack Tree of MA platform 1
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Mobile agents belonging to MA platform 2 build a tree as follows :

157.182.194.28

157.182.194.89
:20

157.182.194.89
:21

157.182.194.89
:22

157.182.194.89
:23

157.182.194.89
:80

157.182.194.89
:111

Fig 9. Attack Tree of MA platform 2

Redundant generation of these attack trees by various agents will be submitted to the
voting server for voting. The voting server picks the majority result and submits it to the
Root Node. The Root Node merges these two sub graphs together, since the source
responsible for this suspicious activity is the same. The Root Node maintains this graph
for a defined period of time. If the graph grows above the size of the threshold the Root
Node concludes the activity as a large scale scan and raises the alarm.
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157.182.194.28

157.182.194.39
:111

157.182.194.39
:111

157.182.194.89
:20

157.182.194.89
:111

Fig 10. Root node’s generation of an attack tree

A typical calculation may involve counting the number of machines and the ports that
were scanned by the attacker and comparing it to see whether a predefined threshold has
been reached.

5.6 Discussion
Our system was entirely designed using the Java language. The choice of Java
was mainly due to the association between Aglets and Java (Aglet is a Java-based mobile
agent). Windows NT platforms were used to run the Aglets servers. The Linux based
machines were used to run the Network Intrusion Detection tool, Snort, and were
responsible for monitoring functions. One of the major problem we faced during our
implementation phase was due to the fact that the ASDK was itself in a development
stage. Certain features that were mentioned in the ASDK documentation did not exist on
the implementation that was provided. As a result we had to adopt different techniques to
work around the problems. This section discusses some of the issues that arose in the
development phase.
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In the current implementation, the leaf nodes multicast their data to the MA
platform which maintains this data in a standard configuration directory. When agents
arrive to an MA platform they poll this directory for the availability of new files. After
processing, these old files are moved to a back up directory. Multicasting the data directly
to the agents is another form of data transmission between agents and the leaf nodes. Our
choice for the first method was due to the inability of the current implementation of the
Aglet framework to maintain references to remote Aglets that have been created and
dispatched to other locations. Therefore an agent cannot retrieve any data transmitted
during it’s movement. Unless a reliable mechanism is put in place for ensuring the agents
receive all the data once they arrive in a location, this method allows for large data loss
due to agent’s constant movement.
Reliability of multicast data remains a concern in both techniques. We could
easily utilize a reliable multicast protocol [MR98] to provide a degree of reliability to the
data transmission. However, as we discussed earlier, the requirement for reliability
should be evaluated on a case by case basis.
Another problem that stems from the Aglets framework’s inability to make
references to the remotes objects is as follows, when an agent is tagged as malicious the
security control node is not able to destroy the agent. Although our implementation
disregards any results provided by malicious agents, the agent will still exist in the
network. All the MA platforms could be informed of malicious agents so that they could
destroy the agent on the arrival to their platform. However providing MA platforms the
ability to destroy agents could lead to a security breach of the system. A safer solution
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would be to let the MA platform inform the security control node about the arrival of the
malicious agent. Until the security control node retrieves the agent the platform should
prevent any attempts by the agent to mobilize to another location.
Currently, our implementation uses simple TCP oriented mechanism to send and
receive node control information between the components. For instance the distribution
of malicious host list by the voting server to the MA platforms is carried out through a
TCP based connection. Instead, a Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
[CF90] could be used. SNMP is a protocol designed to facilitate the exchange of
management information among network devises. SNMP consists of agents that run on
managed devices and a manager that runs on the device responsible for managing others.
The manager sets and queries control information through Management Information
Base (MIB), a database that specifies variables maintained by the agents. Since many
existing networks utilize SNMP for management purposes, the same could be used for
our system with a least number of modifications.
In order to dispatch an agent to a random location, we indexed all MA platforms,
generated a random value between zero and the total number of available MA platforms
and picked the MA platform that holds the random number as it’s index. Smaller the
range higher the possibility for a ‘collision’. A collision we refer to more than one
operational agent being allocated to a MA platform at a time. A light collision would not
have a major impact on the MA platform’s host performance, since these agents are
threads of execution (light weight processes). In a widely distributed environment it is
possible to have a large number of MA platforms to reduce frequent and heavy collisions.
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The voting server requires the timely submission of processed results by all the
agents in a single session. Due to high collision rate in MA platforms, congestion on the
local network and an MA platform’s lower processing speed could cause an agent to
submit it’s results to the voting server later than the other agents in the same domain.
A significant delay, due to the above reasons, could improperly lead the voting server to
reduce the trust level of these agents. This could propagate to the point at which nonmalicious agents are being destroyed. In our implementation the voting server tolerates
this delay by waiting for constant time period after the first submission of a result by any
of the agent. This is clearly an incomplete solution for the problem since the delay is not
a constant factor. Refer the ‘Future Work’ section of this document for more discussions
on solutions to this problem. An interested reader could refer to TCP protocol’s Round
Trip Time (RTT) calculation. TCP has to incorporate congestion on the network before it
determines to resend packets that are considered to be lost.

47

6. Conclusion and Future Work
Due to the rapid growth of the Internet there have been large a deployment of
computer networks over the last decade. The successful inter-operation of these networks
largely depends on their capabilities to communicate between each other. This has
resulted in a well defined communication infrastructure where almost any single system
can communicate with another system over the network. Further the delegation of large
and critical information processing to the computers has increased their importance
among our human society. At the same time increasing their vulnerability to attacks.
Hence it has become very critical to protect computer networks from malicious attackers
who try to interrupt the functionality of these computers.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have become an important component in the
security architecture of a computer. It forms the last line of defense against the attackers.
Detecting intrusions in a distributed environment requires the components of IDS to
spread across different network and gather and process information in different network
localities. As a result, the security of these components itself becomes a great concern.
Protecting these components is necessary for the proper functioning of the Distributed
Intrusion Detection System. In this research we proposed and implemented an attack
resistant architecture using DIDS components as mobile agents.

We plan to develop an API for our mobile agent based internal component so that
it could be incorporated into any hierarchical intrusion detection system and provide
attack resistance capability. Developers could conveniently use our API to customize
and extend the mobile agent architecture to their personal needs.
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Further improvements include utilization of specialized inter-agent
communication frameworks. In the current implementation, the information passing
between the nodes in the IDS hierarchy is carried out through a data structure that holds
information necessary for detecting an intrusion. In the future we would like to use
standard agent communication languages, KQML for instance. This will provide
interoperability between multiple Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) intrusion detection
systems that might be utilized in a large distributed environment. This modification
would also provide a better framework for information sharing between agents and
interoperability of various intrusion detection systems.
Our system still contains several single points of failure. These are, for example,
the voting server and the root node of the IDS. Elimination of these functionally critical
failure points is a major challenge. Making them mobile as the rest of the components
could be a way of solving the problem. However, it is not clear how would this affect the
performance of the overall system.
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Appendix A
Aglet Framework
Aglets are Java-based mobile agents developed by the IBM, Japan research lab.
The Aglet Development Tool Kit (ASDK) provides a set of packages (com.ibm.aglet)
that are necessary for the development of mobile agents. In order for the execution of an
Agent, a system should run an “Aglet host” that provides the execution environment for
the Aglet. The Aglet runs as a thread inside the context of the host application.
An Aglet could experience the following stages throughout its life cycle :
Creation : A new agent is created and initialized. After the creation the Aglet begins
executing it’s run method.
Cloning : Creating a exact copy of an existing Aglet. All the state information is copied.
Dispatch : Mobilizing an Aglet to a different location. During this stage all non transient
and non static variables’ states are saved.
Retract : Acquiring a previously dispatched Aglet.
Deactivate : The execution of the Aglet is halted. The Aglet goes to sleep until it’s
Activate again.
Activate : Waking up a deactivated Aglet.
Dispose : Destroying an Aglet.
The following figure illustrates the AgletFramework :
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Aglet
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Fig 11. Aglet Framework

The Aglet Context provides the environment for the creation and the execution of
Aglets (Framework). The Aglet Proxy serves as an handle for handling communication
between agents. Please note as we mentioned earlier the current implementation of the
Aglet Framework lack the ability to maintain a reference to a remote Aglet. Hence when
an Aglet is created and dispatched from a framework, it loses all the references to that
Aglet.
Examples of Aglet Creation
The following example provides a simple example on how to write Aglets.
The class attempting to create an Aglet should subclass class Aglet, which includes
several methods that can be overridden to customize the behavior of the Aglet.
import com.ibm.aglet.*;
public class AnAgent extends Aglet {

The onCreation() method can be overridden to initialize an Aglet. The
onCreation() method is invoked only once in an Aglet's lifetime and should be used
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only for initialization.
public void onCreation(Object init) {
//Operations performed at the time of Aglet creation
}

The Aglet also has a run() method, which represents the entry point for the
Aglet's main thread. This is similar to the main() method of a Java application, except
that run() is invoked each time an Aglet arrives at a new Aglet host.
public void run() {
//Activity of the thread
}
Each time the Aglet arrives at a new host, a method called onArrival()
would be invoked to perform any initialization. Once onArrival() completes, run()
would be invoked to get the Aglet started again at the new host.
public void onArrival() {
// Operations performed at time of arrival
}
Before an Aglet is dispatched to another location the, it’s onDispatch() is
invoked. This method enables the Aglet to perform any cleanup operations before it is
serialized. When it returns from onDispatch(), its state will be serialized and all its
threads terminated. The class files and serialized state will then be sent to the new host,
where the Aglet will be resurrected.
public void onDispatching() {
Operations performed before being dispatched
}
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Our Say on Aglet Security
The Aglet Framework provides mechanisms to prevent attacks on the host by the
agents. This is achieved through a similar architecture as the JDK security architecture,
where a Policy File defines the permissions available for the Aglets. Each permission
specifies a permitted access to a particular resource, such as read and write access to a
specified file or directory or connect access to a given host and port.
However their are no measures till now for securing Aglets being attacked by
malicious hosts. Hence deploying Aglets as mobile agents for a real world problem
would exhibit various insecure features. Unless additional mechanisms are put in place.
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Appendix B
The voting server holds the responsibility for determining the valid voting candidates.
In order to arrive at this decision, the voting server maintains certain pointers, in the form
of objects, that are indicative of mobile agents and MA platforms trust to operate as
intended.
The agent’s trust level object consists of four values:
number of correct result submissions
number of wrong result submissions
number of no result submissions
A user defined initial agent trust value
The MA platform’s trust level consists of a value representing number of no result
submissions and a user defined initial platform trust value.
Each time a voting takes place the agents’ and platforms’ quantitative values are updated.
After certain number of agent result submissions the trust vales are updated based on
frequency of wrong result submission and no result submission. The following algorithm
illustrates the mobile agents’ and hosts’ trust level updates:
Assume that max_entry holds the majority result after voting is been
carried out for a single event generated by the monitor.
For each agent ID {
if (agent_result (agent ID)= max_entry) then
AgentStat (agent ID).submit += 1;
else {
if agent_result (agent ID) = 0 then
AgentStat (agent ID).nosubmit += 1;
else
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AgentStat (agent ID).wrong_result += 1;
HostStat(agent ID).noresults += 1;
}
}
if (perform_analysis) {
total = submit + nosubmit + result;
nosubmit_fre = nosubmit / total;
result_fre = result / total;
if (nosubmit_fre >= nosubmit_threshold)
AgentStat (agent ID). reduceTrust(1);
if (result_fre >= result_threshold)
AgentStat (agent ID). reduceTrust(2);
if (AgentStat (agent ID). getTrust ()<= trust_threshold)
delete(Agent(agent ID));
else update(AgentStat(agent ID);
if (HostStat(agent ID).noresults / total > host_trust_threshold)
delete(HostStat(agentID);
else update(HostStat(agentID);
}
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Appendix C
1. Aglets Daemon
SYNOPSIS

agletsd [-options]
DESCRIPTION

agletsd is batch file that sets the necessary environment
variables and starts the Aglet Server.
Options
-help
-verbose
-port <port>
-viewer <class>
-resolve
-nosecurity
-commandline
-nogui
-domain

print out this message.
turn on verbose mode.
set the port used by daemon.
set the viewer class.
use fully qualified hostname by resolving
reverse lookup.
disable security manager.
use command line interface.
no gui/cui.
set the domain name.

2. Snort Tool

SYNOPSIS

snort [-abCdDeINopqsvVxX?] [-A alert-mode ] [-c rules-file ] [-F
bpf-file ] [-g grpname ] [-h home-net ] [-i inter- face ] [-l
log-dir ] [-L bin-log-file ] [-M smb-hosts-file ] [-n packetcount ] [-r tcpdump-file ] [-S n=v ] [-t chroot_directory ] [-u
usrname ] expression
DESCRIPTION

Snort is an open source network intrusion detection sys- tem,
capable of performing real-time traffic analysis and packet
logging on IP networks. It can perform protocol analysis, content
searching/matching and can be used to detect a variety of attacks
and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, CGI
attacks, SMB probes, OS fingerprinting attempts, and much more.
Options
-A
-a
-b
-c
-C

alert-mode Alert using the specified alert-mode. Valid alert
modes include fast, full, none, and unsock.
Display ARP packets when decoding packets.
Log packets in a tcpdump(1) formatted file.
config-file
Print the character data from the packet payload only (no hex).
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-d

Dump the application layer data when displaying packets in
verbose or packet logging mode.
-D
Run Snort in daemon mode. Alerts are sent to
/var/log/snort/alert unless otherwise specified.
-e
Display/log the link layer packet headers.
-F
bpf-file Read BPF filters from bpf-file.
-g <grpname> Change the GID Snort runs under to <grpname>
-h
home-net Set the "home network" to home-net.
-i
interface Sniff packets on interface.
-I
Print out the receiving interface name in alerts.
-l
log-dir Set the output logging directory to log-dir.
-L
binary-log-file Set the filename of the binary log file to
binary- log-file.
-M
smb-hosts-file Send WinPopup messages to the list of
workstations contained in the smb-hosts-file .
-n
packet-count Process packet-count packets and exit.
-N
Turn off packet logging. The program still gener- ates
alerts normally.
-o
Change the order in which the rules are applied to packets.
-O
Obfuscate the IP addresses when in ASCII packet dump mode.
-p
Turn off promiscuous mode sniffing.
-q
Quiet operation. Don't display banner and initial- ization
information.
-r
tcpdump-file Read the tcpdump-formatted file tcpdump-file.
-s
Send alert messages to syslog.
-S
n=v Set variable name "n" to value "v".
-t
chroot Changes Snort's root directory to chroot
-u
uname Change the UID Snort runs under to uname
-v
Be verbose.
-V
Show the version number and exit.
-X
Dump the raw packet data starting at the link layer.
-?
Show the program usage statement and exit.
expression selects which packets will be dumped.
(The expressions are similar to the TCPDUMP expressions).

3. Nmap Tool Options
SYNOPSIS

nmap [Scan Type(s)] [Options] <host or net #1 ... [#N]>
DESCRIPTION

Nmap is designed to allow system administrators and curious individuals to scan large networks to determine which
hosts are up and what services they are offering. nmap
supports a large number of scanning techniques such as:
UDP, TCP connect(), TCP SYN (half open), ftp proxy (bounce
attack), Reverse-ident, ICMP (ping sweep), FIN, ACK sweep,
Xmas Tree, SYN sweep, IP Protocol, and Null scan.
OPTIONS
-sT
-sS
-sF -sX -sN
-sP
-sU

TCP connect() scan
TCP SYN scan
Stealth FIN, Xmas Tree, or Null scan modes
Ping scanning
UDP scans
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-sO
-sA
-sW
-sR
-b <ftp relay host>
-p <port ranges>
-e <interface>
-g <portnumber>
-n
-R
-r

IP protocol scans
ACK scan
Window scan
RPC scan
FTP bounce attack
This option specifies what ports you want to
specify.
Tells nmap what interface to send and receive
packets on.
Sets the source port number used in scans.
Tells Nmap to NEVER do reverse DNS resolution on
the active IP addresses it finds.
Tells Nmap to ALWAYS do reverse DNS resolution
on the target IP addresses.
Tells Nmap NOT to randomize the order in which
ports are scanned.
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